


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15 July 1963

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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\*USSR - Communist China: Yesterday's Soviet response to the Chinese party's continuing attacks is the harshest possible condemnation short of a formal break in relations.

In its open letter to the CPSU and the Soviet people, covering four pages of the 14 July Pravda, the Soviet party directly accuses the Chinese leaders of distortion, falsification, using "foul language," phrasemongering, "pseudotheorizing" and lying.

The letter is ostensibly a reply to the tightly reasoned across-the-board exposition of Chinese views contained in the 14 June Chinese letter, which the Soviet Union finally published, but is in fact a free-swinging attack on those aspects that can most easily be exploited.

It is extremely vindictive and even contains a thinly veiled attack on Mao Tse-tung in its criticism of Chinese "exaltation of the cult of personality"--something, the Soviets say, even Stalin was forced to publicly disavow.

The letter reflects the complete deadlock which has developed in the bilateral talks, and its publication suggests an imminent collapse of the talks. Specific note is made that the "CCP representatives

at the meeting continue to aggravate the situation."

By continuing to address the Chinese as "comrades," however, and insisting that unity is still desired and possible, the Soviets indicate that they remain unwilling to take the first step in formalizing the complete rupture in their relations. They may hope that their outright assault will provoke the Chinese into this action.

Like so many of the recent statements in the exchanges between the two parties, this letter is largely aimed at the world Communist parties and will increase the bitterness of the efforts of both sides to strengthen their own factions within those parties. Accusing the Chinese leaders of undermining the unity of the entire world Communist movement, the Soviets for the first time accuse the CCP of organizing and supporting "various antiparty groups of renegades" in the "United States, Brazil, Belgium, Australia, and India." The Chinese are also again accused of using racist propaganda in international front groups to gain adherents.

To drive home its points the Soviet letter resorts to distortion and exaggeration of the Chinese views. It accuses the Chinese of desiring a thermonuclear war which would result in the deaths of hundreds of millions of workers and implies that the Chinese leaders hope they would rule the world rebuilt on these corpses.

The heavy emphasis in the letter on peaceful coexistence, the need for negotiations, the defense of Soviet disarmament pleas, and the support offered to Yugoslavia as a socialist state indicates that the Soviet party intends to pursue its own policies undeterred

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by Chinese criticism. At least on the matter of Yugoslavia, Khrushchev is apparently prepared to follow up his words with some action. He told Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak on 8 July that he planned to spend his vacation with Tito in Yugoslavia next month.

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Nuclear Test-Ban Talks: In his 8 July conversation with Khrushchev, Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak received the impression that Moscow is not making agreement on a partial test ban contingent on the simultaneous signing of a NATO - Warsaw Pact nonaggression treaty.

Spaak told the NATO Council on 12 July that while the Soviet leader mentioned a nonaggression treaty, "it did not seem to be of particular importance" to Khrushchev. Spaak stated that although Khrushchev favored the "idea" of a nonaggression accord, he was "not as enthusiastic" as Spaak had expected he would be.

According to the former NATO secretary general, the subject of disarmament was the "most positive part" of his conversation with Khrushchev. Spaak said Khrushchev "appeared to think" it would be possible to conclude a partial test-ban agreement which excluded underground testing.

The impression Spaak received appears supported by an article in the 13 July Moscow News, the Soviet English-language weekly. According to Ambassador Kohler, the article--by E. Fyodorov, a former member of the Soviet delegation to the US - UK - USSR talks on a test ban--makes "clearer than any statement heretofore" that Moscow has dropped its previous insistence that a moratorium on underground testing accompany a partial test-ban accord

and that Soviet leaders do not intend to insist on the simultaneous signing of a nonaggression pact with a partial test-ban agreement.

Fyodorov focused on the test-ban issue and treated the nonaggression issue "casually as another proposal" which would "really make it possible to lessen international tension." He argued that Khrushchev's 2 July proposal would ban "all tests which can be detected without the slightest doubt."

Khrushchev's decision to open the test-ban talks today reflects the importance the Soviet Union attaches to these negotiations. This action is in sharp contrast to Khrushchev's apparent failure to meet with the Chinese leaders who attended the Sino-Soviet talks in Moscow.

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British Guiana: (Under heavy pressure from Colonial Secretary Duncan Sandys, the opposition People's National Congress (PNC) has indicated its willingness to form a coalition with Premier Jagan to hold office for four months until a new constitutional conference can be held in London.)

(As a means to end East Indian - Negro racial violence--and also to facilitate granting independence to the colony as soon as possible--Sandys has been trying to arrange a coalition since his arrival in the colony last week. Fearful of domination, PNC leader Forbes Burnham had previously rebuffed offers from Jagan for a coalition but on 13 July announced that he would enter discussions which could lead to coalition government.)

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(The PNC has indicated its willingness to let the leader of the United Force, Peter D'Aguiar, have the Finance Ministry, since Sandys insisted that he have a cabinet post. D'Aguiar, who wanted the British to suspend the constitution instead, has not yet indicated whether he will take a cabinet post.)

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Ecuador: Political reactions to the new military junta range from enthusiastic approval by the parties of the right and center to guarded tolerance by the parties of the democratic left, according to US Ambassador Bernbaum.

The junta has requested the cooperation of the political parties in drafting a new "more liberal" constitution to be approved by a constituent assembly. It has also declared its intention to return the nation to an elected civilian government in mid-1964, instead of in 1965 as previously announced.

Communists and extreme leftists, of whom about 150 were rounded up by the armed forces and police on 12 July, apparently have abandoned their plans for mass demonstrations and a general strike.

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Guinea: A major policy struggle appears to be in progress in the regime's ruling political bureau over President Touré's reported decision to terminate the Aeroflot flights to Cuba via Guinea. Extremist elements who are unhappy about the erosion of their power position and Touré's growing rapprochement with the West are believed to be making a firm stand against termination of the flights. Even if Touré does suspend the flights, which the US Embassy in Conakry considers probable, he may feel compelled to make other concessions having the effect of strengthening the extremists and at least slowing down the trend away from the bloc.

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